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Abstract
The present paper investigates individual determinants of retirement
entry age using administrative data on individuals’ retirement entries in
2003 published by the German Pension Insurance (SUF Versichertenrenten-
zugang 2003 ). As preretirement is an important issue in Germany, special
interest is attached to the identification of individuals that preretire: 40
percent of all men and women in the sample preretire. On average they stay
2.4 years in preretirement before taking one of the official retirement plans.
Differences between individual determinants for those choosing preretire-
ment programs as opposed to regular public pension plans are discussed.
A reduced form econometric approach is employed in order to explore
these questions. Noticeable differences arise with respect to rehabilitation
claims before retirement, income before retirement and pension payments.
Overall, the paper puts a great emphasis on discussing sample properties,
variable definitions, and data limitations of administrative data that are
especially useful for follow-up studies.
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1 Introduction
Early retirement and preretirement1 are costly achievements that aggravate the
already tight financial situation of the German pay-as-you-go pension system due
to population aging. Since 1992, pension and labor-market reforms have been
adopted and they greatly restrain publicly subsidized early retirement and pre-
retirement possibilities. Because of these reforms, the distribution of retirement
age of older workers is expected to be changing. These changes can be exploited
to investigate the impact of policy reforms on retirement entry behavior.
So far, there is hardly any research on the impact of pension reforms on
preretirement in Germany. The difficulty consists in observing preretirement in
the data and in providing for a sufficiently long time-series that allows to analyze
policy reforms. The only empirical analysis in this area has been undertaken
by Wu¨bbeke (2005) who uses a data set based on administrative information of
labor-market histories and retirement entries.2 She investigates the impact of
firms’ employment and public social security policy on employees’ changes from
employment into retirement in the period of 1975 to 1995.
Recently, the German Pension Insurance (“Deutsche Rentenversicherung”)
has started to release administrative data for research purposes. This admin-
istrative data is a promising source for investigating the impact of labor and
pension reforms on individual retirement behavior, because it includes detailed
information about individuals’ employment status and pension insurance char-
acteristics. So far, only cross-sectional but no time-series data of individuals’
retirement entries and insurance histories are available. The data set used in this
study, i.e., the Scientific Use File (SUF) Versichertenrentenzugang 2003, is a
representative sample of publicly insured persons who retired in 2003. This data
is used to learn more about how to describe preretirement which will be useful
for future economic analysis of policy reforms based on German administrative
1Preretirement refers to effective retirement before old-age public pension payments can be
received from age 60 onwards and includes the option of partial retirement (“Altersteilzeit”).
Negotiations between employers and employees, and state subsidies enable preretirement. In
contrast, official retirement is defined as receiving public old-age pension payments and, thus,
includes early retirement from age 60 onwards. For a more detailed description of early retire-
ment pathways see Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004).
2This data is not publicly available but results from an - until now - unique example of
combining data on labor-market histories issued by the Institute for Employment Research
(“Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung”) of the Federal Employment Agency (“Bun-
desargentur fu¨r Arbeit”) and data on retirement entries issued by the German Pension Insurance
(“Deutsche Rentenversicherung”)
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data.3 The present paper discusses differences between individual determinants
of retirement for those choosing preretirement programs as opposed to official
public pension plans. A reduced form econometric approach is employed in order
to explore this question.
Based on the SUF Versichertenrentenzugang 2003, the present sample reveals
that 40 percent of all men and women preretire, that is they withdraw from
the labor market before official pathways into old-age retirement can be taken.
On average individuals stay 2.4 years in preretirement before taking one of the
official early retirement entries based on the unemployment or partial retirement
(“Alters-teilzeit”) pathway or retirement plans for women. Moreover, differences
in effects of individual determinants - such as rehabilitation services, income
before retirement and pension payments - on retirement age can be observed for
preretired persons compared to persons taking official retirement entries.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 summarizes institutional facts and
recent changes of early retirement, partial retirement and preretirement in Ger-
many. In Section 3 the data, the sample, and the definition of preretirement are
discussed. Characteristics of the retirement age are presented in Section 4 and,
finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Early Retirement, Partial Retirement and Pre-
retirement in Germany
Early retirement, preretirement and partial retirement refer to regularly used
official and unofficial pathways into retirement before reaching the statutory age
of 65. In order to clarify these concepts and in order to motivate institutional
changes with respect to the public pension system and unemployment insurance
since 1992, they are described in the following.
Early retirement refers to retirement entry before age 65 by one of the official
pathways into old-age retirement, which results in an income stream paid by the
German public pension system. It has been introduced in Germany with the
pension reform in 1972. With the age of 60 women, partial retirees,4 unemployed
or employees, who can not be appropriately employed due to health or labor-
3As discussed in Appendix B the data provided so far by the German Pension Insurance,
i.e., the SUF Versichertenrentenzugang, does not allow for policy analysis of retirement entry
behavior based on option value models.
4The term “partial retirees” refers to persons who enter a partial retirement plan (“Alter-
steilzeit”).
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market reasons, can enter retirement (“Fru¨hrente”). All other employees who
have been contributing to the public pension system for at least 35 years can
retire at the age of 63. These pathways into retirement are not related to any
additional adjustment costs. Consequently, strong incentives are set to retire
before the age of 65 and individuals react accordingly.
A recent survey reveals that two out of three employees would leave the labor
force between age 55 and 60 if this was financially feasible (Pfeiffer and Simons
2004). Preretirement (“Vorruhestand”) meets these preferences and refers to
labor force exits that take place before early retirement is possible. This labor
force exit can be referred to as preretirement if a person receives income paid
by the unemployment insurance or other state subsidies that burden the tax and
social security systems and/or income that results from arrangements between
employers and employees.
One can distinguish between two different ways of entering preretirement. On
the one hand, unemployment compensation is an important way of financing pre-
retirement. If a firm wants to lay off older workers in a restructuring process,
employees can receive a negotiable combination of unemployment compensation
and a supplement or severance pay. At the age of sixty they enter early retire-
ment via the public pension system, i.e., by taking the unemployment pathway.
In the case of preretirement, the date of the labor force exit is very often deter-
mined by the maximum duration of unemployment benefit payments. Until 2005
the duration of benefits paid by the unemployment insurance (“Arbeitslosenver-
sicherung”) lasted between 24 and 32 months.5 Even earlier labor force exits
and corresponding retirement entries can be induced by paying the employee
the difference between the last salary and unemployment assistance (“Arbeit-
slosenhilfe”), which, until 2005, lasted for one additional year. Unemployment
insurance benefits can amount to 67 percent of the last salary and are especially
attractive as the unemployment insurance additionally pays the contributions to
the public pension system.
On the other hand, partial retirement (“Altersteilzeit”) is another means of
preretirement. This scheme provides for part-time work between the age of 55 or
above and early retirement at age 60 or 63 depending on the above mentioned
pathways. Effectively, many employees continue to work full time at first and then
leave their job earlier (“Blockmodell”). Partial retirement is state-subsidized:
The unemployment insurance pays an additional 20 percent of the usual part-
time earnings if the employer hires a young employee. This rule also encourages
5The exact duration depended on the duration of compulsory insurance coverage and on the
age of the beneficiary.
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employers to substitute older by younger employees and meets employees’ interest
in retiring early.
Figure 1 shows the fraction of different pathways into retirement relative to
total retirement for the period of 1978 to 2003. It demonstrates that old-age
pensions due to unemployment have become an important pathway into retire-
ment since the early 1990s for men, whereas among women the unemployment
pathway is not frequently used. Due to low labor-market participation, women
rather take the pathway for women which allows to enter retirement at age 60.
Starting with the pension reforms of 1992 and 1999 and continuing with labor-
market reforms in 2003, several changes to these rules have been adopted. These
changes constrain generous early retirement and preretirement options. The re-
forms of 1992 and 1999 introduced an increase of the retirement age limits to
age 65 or age 63 for long-term insured. These changes will be fully implemented
after a long transitional period in 2015.6 There will no longer be exceptions
for the unemployed, partially retired or women. In Figure 1 a small decrease
in the early retirement options of unemployment pensions for men and women
old-age pensions can already be observed since the late 1990s. Moreover, the
government introduced adjustment costs that reduce pension payments by 0.3
percent for each month of early retirement before age 65. If employers do not
want to accept the lower pension benefit, they either need to work longer or have
to extend the preretirement period, i.e., the period between labor force exit and
retirement payments. From 2005 onwards, unemployment benefits are shortened
from a maximum of 32 to 18 months (“Hartz IV”). Unemployment assistance
will be paid only if the preconditions for welfare payments are fulfilled (“Ar-
beitslosengeld II”). Thus, state-promoted preretirement between labor force exit
and pension benefit payments is now greatly reduced and limited to 18 months.
Transition rules of the pension reforms of 1992 and 1999 already apply to most
cohorts retiring in 2003, whereas the new labor-market regulations have not been
effective before 2005.
All these reform steps indicate a change in paradigm from promoting early and
preretirement towards working longer. These reform steps are backed by the in-
sight that skills of older workers are needed, especially in the course of population
aging, and encouraged by governmental initiatives to bring older workers above
age 50 back into work (“Initiative 50 plus”). Based on descriptive statistics of
recent administrative data of aggregate retirement entries, Reimann (2003) shows
that these changes have already had an effect as the retirement entry behavior
6For a more detailed description of the 1992 and 1999 reforms and a graphical description
of statutory age limits during the transition period refer to Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004).
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Figure 1: Pathways into retirement
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slowly starts to change. However, the pension reforms in 1992 and 1999 have
long transitional periods and are not yet fully phased in. It is of great interest to
exploit this policy change in future research in more detail and to investigate the
responsiveness of retirement entries, preretirement and old-age unemployment to
institutional changes for simulations of future pension and labor-market reform
scenarios.
3 The Data and Sample
The data employed in this study is based on administrative data of the German
public pension insurance that are collected and provided by the German Pension
Insurance (“Deutsche Rentenversicherung”). As these data are made virtually
anonymous, scientific use files entail only a representative sub-sample of all pub-
licly insured individuals or pensioners of the public pension system. This pa-
per employs the SUF Versichertenrentenzugang 2003 (SUFRTZN03XVST Berk)
which is a sample of about 100,000 individuals that started to receive public pen-
sions in 2003. People that are publicly insured but are not yet retired are not
part of the sample.
Administrative data are very valuable to analyze questions on retirement entry
behavior. They have the following advantages compared to German survey-based
data such as the GSOEP: First, samples are large representative draws of the
whole population of publicly insured persons. Second, there is no attrition. Third,
there are no problems with the interpretation of questions as it is often the
case with survey responses. Fourth and most importantly, the sample provides
information on individuals’ insurance status before retirement and entails all the
relevant information to determine a person’s pension claims, e.g., information on
earnings points7, on various contribution periods and the type of pension that is
received.
But administrative data are also associated with difficulties.8 One major issue
is the measurement of the effective retirement age, which is discussed in detail
in the remainder of the paper. Other issues are the measurement of income,
wealth and socio-economic variables.9 Information on these characteristics are
7In Germany the calculation of pension payments is based on earnings points. For each
person the number of earnings points depends mainly on the relative earnings position and the
number of contributions.
8These difficulties differ from problems with German survey data. It would therefore be
interesting to compare the GSOEP to the present administrative data in detail. This, however,
lies beyond the scope of the present paper.
9For a detailed description of the data see also Himmelreicher (2006) and Radl (2005).
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available as far as the public pension system retains them for the determination
of individual pension claims. Income refers to income subject to social security
contributions only and wealth is not recorded at all. Person’s health status can be
inferred by using a variable that describes whether medical rehabilitation services
have been taken in the last 5 years before retirement. Direct information is avail-
able, for example, on education, family status, residence and details necessary
for the calculation of public pension payments.
For some variables more than pure cross-sectional information is provided,
i.e., gross yearly income subject to social security contributions and the status
of insurance in the three years before retirement. The latter provides additional
information on individuals’ situation, i.e., whether they are self-employed or un-
employed before retirement.
For the subsequent analysis the sample is limited to individuals between age
54 and 72 that receive an old-age or disability pension for the first time in 2003.
Individuals with partial pensions are excluded from the sample as these persons
are likely to be still partially employed. Observations with pension payments that
are significantly determined by inter- or supranational legislation are not consid-
ered, because these are determined by factors that are out of reach in this study.
Problematic for the analysis are also pensions paid on the basis of the “Frem-
drentengesetz” (FRG) which include mainly East-Germans that took refuge from
Eastern to Western Germany and resettlers (“Aussiedler” and “Spa¨taussiedler”).
As suggested by Mika (2005), these observations are excluded from the sample as
their pension payments and corresponding information in the data are based on
fictive contributions. The adjustment of pension payments in East Germany to
West German levels has almost been completed in 2003. Therefore, differences
affecting the retirement entry age should be minimal and observations from both
East and West Germany are included in the sample.
3.1 Retirement Age in German Administrative Data
Administrative data provide detailed and reliable information on individual pen-
sion claims that are necessary for meaningful analyses of individual retirement
entries and labor force exits. The retirement age in administrative data is de-
fined as the age at which a pension is received from the German public pension
insurance for the first time. This retirement age is referred to in the following as
the official retirement age. Thus preretirement is not considered. There are three
main motivations for taking account of preretirement and for considering the ef-
fective instead of the official retirement age in economic analyses of retirement
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entries: First, recent pension and labor-market reforms, among other things, aim
at limiting preretirement as it aggravates the financial situation of the social se-
curity systems. It is of great interest to investigate the impact of these reforms on
preretirement using administrative data. Second, it is important to take account
of preretirement if overall financial effects of retirement entries on social security
systems are of interest instead of financial effects on the public pension system
alone as preretirement typically burdens the unemployment insurance. Third,
survey-based data show that individuals refer to themselves as retired when they
have not yet officially retired but are preretired (Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. 2004b).
For a consistent estimation of individual retirement entry decisions it is, thus,
necessary to use the effective as opposed to the official retirement entry age.
Preretirement cases can be identified in the data as information on individ-
uals’ insurance status is available not only for the year before retirement, i.e.,
for 2002, but also for 2001 and 2000. The insurance status specifies whether a
person (i) had an employment that was subject to social security contributions,
whether a person was (ii) marginally employed (“geringfu¨gig bescha¨ftigt”),10 (iii)
eligible for a partial pension plan (“Altersteilzeit”), (iv) voluntarily insured,11
(v) compulsorily insured mainly due to unemployment or sickness,12 (vi) pas-
sively insured or (vii) in some other insurance category.13 Table 1 summarizes
the fraction of each insurance category in the present sample. Half of the individ-
uals have been passively insured or compulsorily insured due to unemployment
or sickness. Passive insurance refers to all persons that have not paid any so-
cial insurance contributions in the year before retirement. 50 percent of these
individuals have not paid any contributions for more than 20 years. This group
inter alia includes civil servants or self-employed that have earned pension claims
due to employment subject to social security insurance at some point in time,
typically very early in their career. A third group is made up of individuals that
gave up employment early which are mostly housewives.
As summarized in Section 2 individuals are considered to be preretired if they
were unemployed, partially retired, marginally employed or passively insured. In
order to rule out cases that have been passively insured for a very long period,
10A person is considered marginally employed if he or she does not earn more than 400 Euros
per month. Special rules with respect to social security insurance apply to these persons.
11These are mainly self-employed persons or housewives who have no income subject to social
security insurance but voluntarily take part in the German public pension system.
12For exact definitions refer to the German Social Security Code (“Sozialgesetzbuch”), SGB
III and § 3 Nr. 3 SGB VI.
13This category includes for example persons that were eligible to insurance credits (“An-
rechnungszeiten”) or other compulsory insurances that are not part of (v).
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Table 1: Insurance status before official retirement
insurance status percent*
employment s.t. social insurance contributions 20.64
marginally employed 4.14
compulsorily insured (unemployment, sickness) 23.92
partial retirement plan 12.46
voluntarily insured 3.31
passively insured 25.60
others 9.93
Source: Own calculations based on SUF Versichertenrentenzugang
2003 (SUFRTZN03XVST Berk).
*) Percentages relative to all individuals in the sample that officially
retired in 2003.
(e.g. housewives, self-employed or civil servants) only those are included that
have paid contributions to the public pension insurance at least once during the
last 10 years before official retirement in 2003. At the same time, persons that
return to an employment status subject to social security contributions or to
voluntary insurance are not included in this pool of preretired persons.14 This
classification of preretirement is taken from Pfeiffer and Simons (2004) who inves-
tigate preretirement in Germany using various data sources. With this definition,
47 percent of men and 37 percent of women preretired in the present sample, i.e.,
effectively retired before 2003.15
The sample also includes disability pensions. Note that preretirement in this
study covers part of the disability cases. Persons retiring due to disability amount
to 10 percent in the present sample. Half of them receive a disability pension
directly after leaving the labor force, another 30 percent after a period of un-
14Also, persons that enter preretirement at age 63 or later are not considered as preretired.
These are only a few cases.
15Due to a censoring problem for the year 2000 it is not possible to determine whether
individuals who are effectively retired in 2000 entered retirement in 2000 or before. For the de-
termination of the effective retirement age this is, however, necessary. All individuals preretired
before 2001 are assumed to have entered preretirement in 2000. Compared to the alternative
of excluding these observations from the sample, this assumption is justified: The resulting
average of duration in preretirement in the present sample amounts to 2.4 years and is only
slightly lower than the average duration of preretirement in the GSOEP data which is 2.5 years
(Pfeiffer and Simons 2004).
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employment. According to the above mentioned definition, the latter case may
fall into the preretirement category, whereas the first does not. Declaring part
of the disability cases as preretired is reasonable, because obtaining a disability
pension due to labor-market reasons is still possible for cohorts retiring in 2003.
However, it has become much more difficult over time.16
Figure 2 displays retirement entry probabilities in 2003 for men and women
aged 54 to 72 that take official pathways into retirement. Preretirement is not
accounted for in the data underlying this figure. The distributions for men and
women are characterized by two large spikes at age 60 and 65. There is also a
third spike for men at age 63. For women the spikes at age 60 and 65 are more
pronounced than for men. These differences can be explained by differences in
employment histories and different retirement pathways for men and women. 27
percent of all women retire at age 60. This high value is due to a pension pathway
that allows women under certain conditions to enter retirement at age 60. This
pathway still exists in 2003, however, adjustment costs have to be taken into
account. Another 41 percent of all women retire at age 65. Due to interrupted
employment histories, women often have not contributed a sufficiently long time
period into the public pension system such that they are not eligible to choose
this or any other pathway to retire before age 65.
The distribution of retirement age between age 54 and 72 is smoother for
men: 20 percent retire at age 60, 18 percent at age 63 and 25 percent at age 65.
From age 60 onwards men can retire via the unemployment or partial retirement
pathway. From age 63, they are eligible for retirement if they are long-term
insured. In 2003 adjustment costs apply to almost all cohorts that choose one of
these retirement pathways.
The average official retirement entry age17 for men and women as reported in
the present sample amounts to 62.3 and 62.5 years respectively. Once preretire-
ment is considered, the average effective retirement age is about one year lower:
61.3 years for men and 61.6 years for women. In the present sample men and
women preretire on average at age 59.3 and 59.2 respectively and officially retire
after 2.4 years.18
16Note the reduction in disability pensions since 1978 in Figure 1.
17“Official” refers to the fact that these individuals enter retirement through one of the
official pathways (old-age or disability pensions) and receive pension payments from the German
Pension Insurance. The numbers refer to average values in the present sample and, therefore,
do not exactly match statistics issued by the German Pension Insurance.
18These average values are only approximately correct. Note that the group of preretired
persons in this sample refers to persons preretiring in 2000 to 2002 and officially retiring in
2003. In order for this group to be representative for preretirement cases in 2003, one has to
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Figure 2: Distribution of retirement entry age in 2003
0
10
20
30
40
50
pe
rc
en
t
54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72
age
men women
Source: Own calculations based on SUF Versichertenrentenzu-
gang 2003 (SUFRTZN03XVST Berk), German Pension Insurance
(“Deutsche Rentenversicherung”).
3.2 Other Variables
In order to characterize retirement entry age the data set provides several vari-
ables for the subsequent regression analysis: income before retirement, pension
payments, socio-demographic characteristics such as highest educational degree,
status of sickness, marital status, and times of child-caring.
Income in administrative data refers to income subject to social security con-
tributions. It does not mirror a person’s complete income position. Therefore,
income of passively or voluntarily insured individuals is missing. These individu-
als mainly obtain income from other sources, e.g., self-employed or civil servants
who have had an employment subject to social security contributions only at the
beginning of their career. Also housewives belong to this group. In case of house-
wives but also more generally in the case of couples, especially with children, it
would be desirable to use a couple’s income. However, the data does not allow
to match couples.
assume that preretirement cases in 2000 to 2002 are representative for preretirement cases in
2003 that officially retire in 2004 to 2006, i.e., one has to assume that no cohort and time effects
exist for the years 2000 to 2006. As retirement entry rules are changing due to long transitional
periods of the reforms of 1992 and 1999, time effects can not fully be ruled out.
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As the idea of the following econometric analysis is to provide a picture of the
characteristics of retirement entry age as provided by the administrative data at
hand, observations with missing income values are not dropped, but explicitly
controlled for. An income dummy is constructed that is equal to one if the
income value is missing, income mis. 26 percent of all men and 44 percent of all
women have reported missing incomes values. Almost 70 percent of these men
and women are passively insured.19
Another shortcoming of the income variable is the censoring of yearly income
values greater than 55,000 Euros. In order to circumvent the censoring problem
at the top end of the income distribution, dummies for income quintiles are
constructed for men and women with reported income values.20
Pension payments are directly obtained from the data. The corresponding
variable refers to public pensions only. As pension payments are censored at
values greater than 1800 Euros per month, again dummies for pension payment
quintiles are constructed.21
Information on education is classified by the highest individual educational
degree: secondary school (“Hauptschule” and “Mittlere Reife”), high school
(“Abitur”), technical college (“Fachhochschule”) or university. The categories
secondary and high school are subdivided into cases with and without vocational
training (“Berufsausbildung”). Dummy variables equal to one for the highest
educational degree are constructed and included in the regression analysis. Fur-
thermore, there is one category referring to unknown education levels and an-
other category referring to missing values. The latter category includes about
one-third of all observations. These are mostly individuals that entered retire-
ment not directly after employment: 57 percent are passively insured and 20
percent are unemployed in the year before retirement. Thus, no information on
the educational degree was provided by a former employer.22 The category of
missing educational degrees is clearly non-random and related to the insurance
status before retirement and is, therefore, separately included in the regression.
The distribution of observations with unknown educational degree across income
classifications is also likely to be non-random and enters as an additional dummy
19Because of missing income values one could alternatively consider to drop all passively
insured persons who have not contributed to the public pension system within the last 10 years
and all voluntarily insured persons. Another way to deal with the problem would be to impute
income and wealth by using the GSOEP.
20For exact quintile ranges see Table 5, Appendix A.
21For the exact range of quintiles see Table 5, Appendix A.
22For further background information on the education variable refer to Fitzenberger,
Osikominu and Vo¨lter (2005).
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variable.23
The health status can be proxied by two different variables: An indicator
variable that denotes whether a person has claimed rehabilitation services during
the last 5 years previous to retirement24 and a variable that comprises months of
insurance credits due to sickness or rehabilitation.
Information on a person’s marital status and on the number of months dedi-
cated to child-caring are provided. It is important to mention that this number
refers only to cases in which times of child-caring are credited and lead to higher
pension benefits. This variable, therefore, does not directly measure the number
of children.
Finally, information on individuals insurance status is categorized. The follow-
ing dummy variables are included in the regression analysis: employment subject
to social insurance contributions; partial retirement; compulsory insurance due
to unemployment, sickness or rehabilitation; marginal employment; voluntary
employment; passive insurance and others.
Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix A provide definitions and summary statistics of
all variables that are of interest in the subsequent regression analysis.
4 Characteristics of the Official and Effective
Retirement Age
As all people in the sample officially retire in 2003 or effectively retire during the
short window between 2000 and 2003, the main sample variation results from
the differences in retirement age across individuals. The determinants of this
variation are investigated using standard OLS regressions with heteroscedastic-
ity robust standard errors. Estimations are undertaken separately for men and
women as retirement entry behavior and the corresponding retirement age are
likely to be affected by systematic differences in employment histories. In a first
step, retirement age is defined as a person’s age in 2003, which is the official
retirement age. In a second step, retirement entry age refers to a person’s age
when effectively retiring. Therefore, individuals who preretire are identified and
their official retirement age is adjusted to their effective retirement age.
23In this group 33 percent of individuals are employed subject to social security contributions,
21 percent are unemployed and 25 percent are marginally employed, the rest splits up into all
other categories.
24Persons that receive a disability pension have often taken rehabilitation services before
retiring. However, this is no precondition for obtaining a disability pension in Germany.
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4.1 The Official Retirement Age
Two different specifications are estimated: The first one includes variables for
income, pension, education, health status, marital status and child-caring (Table
2), whereas the second specification additionally includes dummies for insurance
categories as described in the previous section (Table 2). Variables referring
to income subject to social security contributions in the year before retirement
and retirement income paid by the public pension insurance in 2003 are de-
fined as dummy variables of income or pension income classes: A dummy for
missing income values, income mis, as well as dummies for income and pension
payment quintiles are constructed: income 1st, ..., income 5th, pension 1st, ...,
pension 5th. This classification does not allow to interpret the absolute effects
but effects relative to the reference category, which is the third quintile for both
income and pension payments respectively, income 3rd and pension 3rd.
The results show that men and women with missing income values, that are
mainly passively and voluntarily insured individuals, retire later compared to all
other income classes. On the one hand, this could be explained by the fact that
passively insured individuals are often not eligible to retirement pathways that
allow for retirement before age 65. On the other hand, voluntarily insured indi-
viduals are often self-employed and typically retire at higher ages than employees.
Relative to the third income quintile, low incomes (first and second quintile)
are associated with lower retirement ages among men whereas very high incomes
(fifth quintile) are associated with higher retirement ages. Except for the first
quintile the effect for women looks similar. This category tends to retire later:
Women with very low incomes have typically very unstable employment histories
and insurance periods due to child-caring. Therefore, they often might not be
eligible to early retirement, i.e., retirement before age 65.
The lower pension payments, the higher are - relative to the third quintile -
retirement entry ages (refer to the coefficients on pension 1st and pension 2nd).
This result is in line with the following consideration: Many people who retire
late, i.e., with the age of 65, are not eligible to one of the pathways into early
retirement. These are mostly passively and voluntarily insured people that typ-
ically receive low pension payments. This way into retirement applies to the
typical housewife and is, therefore, more common among women compared to
men. In line with this consideration, there is a much larger effect for women
compared to men.
Income and pension payments are of course strongly correlated. Note, how-
ever, that in the present data this correlation is actually weaker than one might
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Table 2: Characteristics of the official retirement age I
men women men women
income mis 1.728*** 1.039*** high school -0.547** 0.271
[0.087] [0.067] [0.269] [0.316]
income 1st -0.336*** 0.065 high school V T -0.538*** -0.029
[0.067] [0.051] [0.120] [0.145]
income 2nd -0.354*** -0.444*** sec sch -0.936*** -0.365***
[0.042] [0.032] [0.071] [0.099]
income 4th -0.081** -0.301*** sec sch V T -0.955*** -0.437***
[0.033] [0.044] [0.056] [0.095]
income 5th 0.365*** 0.472*** edu unknown -0.643*** -0.054
[0.076] [0.064] [0.069] [0.100]
pension 1st 1.598*** 2.814*** edu missing -1.350*** -0.179*
[0.050] [0.032] [0.063] [0.097]
pension 2nd 0.607*** 1.188*** reha -3.279*** -3.576***
[0.053] [0.030] [0.066] [0.070]
pension 4th -0.360*** 0.136*** sickness -0.034*** -0.020***
[0.029] [0.031] [0.004] [0.005]
pension 5th -0.219*** -0.677*** childcare 0.013*** 0.014***
[0.072] [0.034] [0.003] [0.001]
tech col -0.722*** -0.571*** married 0.178*** -0.288***
[0.083] [0.151] [0.031] [0.022]
No. of obs. 33917 38285
R2 0.3 0.51
Notes: The dependent variable is the retirement entry age in 2003, age; OLS estimations with
White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
expect at first:25 For several cases income values are not reported (see previous
section) or employment histories are rather instable before retirement such that
income measured in the year before retirement is no perfect proxy for individuals’
relative income positions over the life cycle.
Compared to persons with lower educational degrees, men with a university
degree, uni, have a higher retirement age.26 This finding is in line with the gen-
eral notion that people with higher education are more attached to their jobs
and, therefore, tend to work longer. Moreover, they are typically less physi-
25The actual correlation coefficient amounts to 0.71.
26The reference category are men or women with a university degree.
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cally strained and are able to work longer. Men with a technical college degree,
tech col, or secondary schooling degree, sec sch or sec sch V T , have compara-
tively low retirement ages, i.e., they retire on average between 8 to 11 month
earlier. Men with high school degrees, high sch and high sch V T , lie in between
these two extremes. Results for women are similar, though smaller in size and
less significant. The fact that the association between education and retirement
age is much weaker for women could again be explained by interrupted employ-
ment histories. Due to child bearing and caring, many women have not followed
a career that is suggested by their educational degree.
Both health measures, reha and sickness, reveal that a higher degree of health
is associated with a higher retirement entry age for men and women which is a
well documented phenomenon.27 The number of months credited by the public
pension insurance due to sickness or rehabilitation has only a very small quantita-
tive effect on the retirement age.28 If men or women have claimed rehabilitation
services due to sickness, they retire on average more than three years earlier. The
present data show that these are mostly cases that take the disability pathway
into retirement. However, rehabilitation is no necessary precondition for receiving
a disability pension in Germany.
The number of months dedicated to child-caring as measured by the public
pension insurance, childcare, on average leads to a higher retirement age for both
men and women, though the effect is low in size. This result is well in line with
Hank (2004) who investigates in great detail the relationship between women’s
retirement behavior and fertility biographies.
Married women retire on average three to four months earlier than singles
or widows. This finding could be explained by the fact that wives are generally
younger than husbands and often try to retire at approximately the same age as
their husbands. For men the effect is mirror-inverted: Married men retire about
two months later on average. The result is in line with the consideration that in
the generation of interest married men are mostly responsible for the main family
income source and, thus, work longer in order to afford retirement for the couple
and possibly education for the children.
In a second specification, additional dummy variables for individuals with par-
tial retirement, part ret, compulsory insurance due to unemployment, sickness or
rehabilitation, comp ins, marginal employment, marg emp, voluntary insurance,
vol ins, passive insurance, pas ins, and other insurance status, others, before re-
27Refer to e.g. Larsen and Gupta (2004) who provide for a large literature on this topic.
28An exact quantitative interpretation is not very reliable as the measure is censored at 48
months of credited insurance contributions due to sickness.
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tirement in 2003 are added (Table 3). The reference category is employment
subject to social social security contributions.
Men and women with partial retirement or compulsory insurance due to un-
employment have a lower retirement age. Both groups are able to retire early
due to a special retirement pathway for unemployment and partial retirement
that still applies to cohorts in the present sample, though adjustment costs have
already phased in. The effect is smaller for women. This corresponds well with
the possibility of women to enter retirement under the same conditions and as
early as unemployed persons or as individuals subject to a partial retirement
plan. Marginally employed, voluntarily and passively insured persons on average
retire much later. Most of the individuals in these three categories are not eli-
gible for retirement before age 65, probably because of too short insurance and
contribution periods. Effects for men and women are qualitatively the same and
just slightly differ in size.29
Naturally, correlations between individual characteristics and the retirement
age are largely driven by the institutional framework such as insurance categories
or rehabilitation services and to a smaller extent by socio-economic characteristics
such as education, child-caring or marriage. The level of income subject to social
security contributions and pension payments are also but to a smaller extent
important determinants. The results in Tables 2 and 3 underline the importance
of employing incentive variables that bundle the institutional framework as well
as individuals’ employment histories and future expected pension payments when
determining individuals’ retirement entry ages, as e.g. undertaken in Berkel and
Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004).
4.2 The Effective Retirement Age
Due to generous preretirement possibilities, about 40 percent of individuals in
the sample effectively retire before their official retirement date. These cases
are identified and their effective retirement age is defined as described in Sec-
tion 3.1. The present section investigates whether individuals’ characteristics are
significantly different with respect to retirement age for preretired individuals as
opposed to individuals taking official pension plans. The regressions documented
29Note that in this specification the estimated coefficients of the income and pension payment
dummies differ. The change is due to a correlation of income and insurance categories. Only in
the case of the missing income category, income mis, there is a substantial qualitative change in
the estimated coefficient. As this category is strongly correlated with the insurance categories of
passively and voluntarily insured persons, the positive effect is now captured by these dummies,
passive and vol ins.
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Table 3: Characteristics of the official retirement age II
men women men women
income mis -0.818*** -1.262*** sec sch V T -0.982*** -0.318***
[0.116] [0.076] [0.070] [0.098]
income 1st -0.366*** -0.465*** edu unknown -0.672*** -0.118
[0.066] [0.051] [0.069] [0.099]
income 2nd -0.194*** -0.305*** edu missing -1.341*** -0.251***
[0.043] [0.032] [0.065] [0.097]
income 4th -0.027 -0.273*** reha -3.262*** -3.340***
[0.033] [0.042] [0.067] [0.069]
income 5th 0.284*** 0.259*** sickness -0.034*** -0.017***
[0.075] [0.061] [0.004] [0.004]
pension 1st 0.871*** 2.049*** childcare 0.010*** 0.013***
[0.054] [0.036] [0.003] [0.001]
pension 2nd 0.141*** 0.821*** married 0.165*** -0.275***
[0.053] [0.030] [0.030] [0.021]
pension 4th -0.304*** 0.104*** part ret -0.683*** -0.294***
[0.028] [0.030] [0.035] [0.035]
pension 5th -0.243*** -0.862*** comp ins -0.683*** -0.308***
[0.074] [0.041] [0.038] [0.036]
tech col -0.688*** -0.465*** marg emp 0.951*** 1.848***
[0.081] [0.150] [0.119] [0.060]
high school -0.539*** 0.028 vol ins 2.520*** 2.360***
[0.119] [0.143] [0.110] [0.090]
high school V T -0.629** 0.267 pas ins 3.000*** 2.999***
[0.266] [0.328] [0.100] [0.070]
sec sch -0.978*** -0.362*** others 0.261*** 0.743***
[0.056] [0.094] [0.081] [0.057]
No. of obs. 33917 38285
R2 0.35 0.57
Notes: see Table 2.
in Table 2 are repeated with interaction terms between a preretirement dummy,
P , and each explanatory variable (Table 4).30
30The estimation of interacted effects for preretired persons is equivalent to a separate re-
gression for this group.
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Table 4: Characteristics of the effective retirement age
men women men women
income mis 0.32 0.054 income mis ∗ P 0.349 0.108
[0.197] [0.120] [0.273] [0.192]
income 1st -0.071 -0.058 income 1st ∗ P 0.073 -0.228
[0.143] [0.097] [0.201] [0.143]
income 2nd -0.210** -0.503*** income 2nd ∗ P -0.365*** 0.029
[0.083] [0.048] [0.106] [0.069]
income 4th -0.251*** -0.587*** income 4th ∗ P 1.342*** 1.423***
[0.053] [0.064] [0.064] [0.073]
income 5th 0.166 0.059 income 5th ∗ P -0.751*** -0.663***
[0.168] [0.122] [0.242] [0.182]
pension 1st 1.481*** 2.672*** pension 1st ∗ P 0.276* 0.239***
[0.056] [0.044] [0.150] [0.062]
pension 2nd 0.761*** 1.400*** pension 2nd ∗ P -0.664*** -0.632***
[0.065] [0.044] [0.115] [0.058]
pension 4th -0.560*** 0.081* pension 4th ∗ P 0.228*** 0.104*
[0.050] [0.048] [0.058] [0.059]
pension 5th -0.207*** -0.680*** pension 5th ∗ P -0.304 -0.085
[0.067] [0.043] [0.283] [0.060]
tech col -0.673*** -0.791*** tech col ∗ P 0.182 0.363
[0.118] [0.231] [0.155] [0.279]
high school -0.740* 0.631* high school ∗ P 0.098 -0.771
[0.403] [0.377] [0.500] [0.508]
high school V T -0.655*** 0.054 high school V T ∗ P 0.303 -0.465*
[0.167] [0.214] [0.222] [0.268]
Note: This table continues on the next page.
sec sch -1.028*** -0.399*** sec sch ∗ P 0.112 -0.162
[0.095] [0.151] [0.130] [0.186]
sec sch V T -1.151*** -0.407*** sec sch V T ∗ P 0.466*** -0.159
[0.070] [0.145] [0.102] [0.179]
edu unknown -0.578*** 0.096 edu unknown ∗ P -0.269** -0.510***
[0.091] [0.152] [0.126] [0.187]
edu missing -0.848*** 0.293* edu missing ∗ P 0.028 -0.805***
[0.106] [0.150] [0.132] [0.183]
reha -4.245*** -4.000*** reha*P 2.533*** 1.936***
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[0.089] [0.093] [0.124] [0.132]
sickness -0.043*** -0.022*** sickness*P 0.008 0.01
[0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.008]
childcare 0.009** 0.012*** childcare*P 0.009 0
[0.004] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001]
married 0.069 -0.368*** married*P 0.222*** 0.215***
[0.046] [0.028] [0.060] [0.041]
P -3.317*** -2.664*** No. of obs. 33557 37992
[0.388] [0.257] R2 0.54 0.67
Notes: The dependent variable is retirement entry age in 2000-2003 which is adjusted for pre-
retirement, agef ; P is a dummy equal to one if a person preretires as defined in Section 3.1;
OLS estimations with White-heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
Overall, the effects for preretired individuals31 are qualitatively similar to the
reference category, i.e., individuals that take official pension plans. Main differ-
ences exist with respect to the size of the effects on rehabilitation, income and
pension payments: Most importantly, the negative association between claims of
rehabilitation services before retirement, reha, and retirement age is much smaller
for preretired men and women. If rehabilitation services are taken, the retirement
age of persons with regular pension plans is on average almost four years lower
whereas preretired men are only about one and a half years and preretired women
two years younger compared to persons not claiming any rehabilitation services.
This observation can be explained by the fact that the frequency of rehabilitation
services in the present data is much higher for persons between age 54 and 60
compared to older persons. At the same time, rehabilitation is strongly corre-
lated with disability pension entries at ages below 60. Therefore, persons who
take rehabilitation services seem less likely to take the preretirement pathway but
rather the disability pathway.
Differences in effects between preretired individuals and the rest of the sample
are large for individuals with middle and high incomes: The estimated effects
differ substantially for the fourth and fifth quintile, whereas there is no or only
a small difference with respect to the missing values dummy and the first and
second income quintile.
There are also significant differences between preretired individuals and those
taking official pathways into retirement across all pension payments quintiles,
except for the fifth quintile. In spite of the quantitative differences, there is
31These effects are obtained by adding the interaction effect and the respective effect for the
reference group.
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still a similar qualitative pattern for both groups, though: Relative to the third
quintile, lower pension payments are associated with a higher retirement age and
higher pension payments are associated with a lower retirement age.
To summarize: Claiming rehabilitation services before retirement has a much
lower effect on retirement age for preretired individuals compared to the rest of
the sample. Also income in the year before retirement and pension payments in
2003 have different effects for preretired persons. However, there is no obvious
and easy to interpret pattern of differences in income and pension effects between
the two groups. Further minor differences can be observed with respect to marital
status and education.32 Overall, the estimated differences in effects with respect
to rehabilitation services, income and pensions as well as the large number of
identified preretirement cases underline the relevance of taking account of prere-
tirement in administrative data when individual retirement entry decisions and
effects of retirement entries on the overall social security system are of interest.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
The present paper employs administrative data of individuals’ retirement entries
in 2003 (SUF Versichertenrentenzugang 2003 ) provided by the German Pension
Insurance. Retirement entry in administrative data is defined as receiving pen-
sion payments for the first time. This does, however, not include the possibility
of preretirement. The issue of preretirement plays an important role in recent
pension and labor-market reforms. s
Preretirement is defined as leaving the labor force and effectively retiring be-
fore any official pathways into retirement can be taken. Until official retirement
individuals receive financial support through arrangements between the state,
employers and employees that typically burden the social security system. These
arrangements are often very generous for the employee such that this option has
been frequently used: 40 percent of all men and women in the sample preretire.
They stay on average 2.4 years in preretirement before taking one of the regular
retirement plans. Moreover, the present paper investigates individual determi-
nants of retirement entry age such as income, pension payments, measures for
education, health and family status. It is investigated whether individuals’ char-
acteristics are significantly different with respect to retirement age for the group
of preretired individuals and individuals taking regular pension plans. Noticeable
32There is a difference in estimated effects of edu unknown and edu missing which is per
definition mainly driven by a larger number of passively insured persons in the preretired sub-
sample.
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differences arise with respect to rehabilitation claims before retirement, income
before retirement and pension payments.
These insights are based on analyzing German administrative data. Such data
is very advantageous with respect to detailed and reliable information on individ-
uals pension characteristics and the number of observations. Information is only
provided as far as it is relevant for the calculation of pensions. Consequently, in-
come variables are censored, information on wealth is non-existent and retirement
entry is defined as obtaining public pension payments. In order to provide useful
information for future studies based on German administrative data provided by
the German Pension Insurance, the paper discusses those issues.
In light of recent reform initiatives in Germany concerning the labor market
(unemployment insurance) or social security legislation (retirement entry rules
and adjustment costs) interesting future research questions arise: What is the
impact of these reforms on retirement entries, labor force exits and preretire-
ment? How will future pension and labor-market reforms change the distribution
of retirement entry age? Such research questions are typically analyzed in option
value models of individual retirement entry behavior, e.g., Bo¨rsch-Supan (1992),
Schmidt (1995), Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schmidt (1996), Siddiqui (1997), Bo¨rsch-
Supan (2000), Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004), Antolin and Scarpetta (1998).
Administrative data that is available so far, i.e., the SUF Versichertenrenten-
zugang 2003, does not yet include sufficient variation in individuals’ retirement
entry decisions in order to investigate these questions. Appendix B discusses
why an option value approach is not feasible with the data at hand and describes
the necessary data characteristics for such an undertaking. In particular, it is
essential to have data that includes not only observations of retirement entries
but also of older workers still in the labor force and not yet retired. It is of great
interest to release such administrative data in order to accomplish the estimation
of structural models of retirement entry decisions and labor force exits that can
be used for policy analysis.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix A - The Data
Table 5: Variable definitions
Variable Description
age retirement entry age in 2003
agef retirement entry age in 2000-2003, preretirement is taken into
account as described in Section 3.1
income mis dummy variable equal to one if income subject to social security .
contributions is missing in 2002
income 1st dummy variable equal to one if income subject to social security
ranges between ]0; 428] Euros per month in 2002
income 2nd dummy variable equal to one if income subject to social security
ranges between ]428; 1141] Euros per month in 2002
income 3rd dummy variable equal to one if income subject to social security
ranges between ]1141; 1957] Euros per month in 2002
income 4th dummy variable equal to one if income subject to social security
ranges between ]1957; 2870[ Euros per month in 2002
income 5th dummy variable equal to one if income subject to social security
is above 2870 Euros per month in 2002
pension 1st dummy equal to one if public pension payments range
between ]0; 266] Euros per month in 2003
pension 2nd dummy equal to one if public pension payments range
between ]266; 537] Euros per month in 2003
pension 3rd dummy equal to one if public pension payments range
between ]537; 794] Euros per month in 2003
pension 4th dummy equal to one if public pension payments range
between ]794; 1122[ Euros per month in 2003
pension 5th dummy equal to one if public pension payments are above
1122 Euros per month in 2003
reha dummy variable equal to one if rehabilitation services were
claimed during the last 5 years before retirement
sickness number of months with insurance credits due to sickness
or rehabilitation
childcare number of months with insurance credits for child-caring
married dummy variable equal to one if an individual is married
25
or widowed
sec sch dummy variable equal to one if the highest educational degree
is from secondary school
sec sch VT dummy variable equal to one if the highest educational degree
is from secondary school plus vocational training
high sch dummy variable equal to one if the highest educational degree
is from high school
high sch VT dummy variable equal to one if the highest educational degree
is from high school plus vocational training
tech col dummy variable equal to one if the highest educational degree
is from a technical college
uni dummy variable equal to one if the highest educational degree
is from university
edu missing dummy variable equal to one if the highest educational degree
is a missing value
edu unknown dummy variable equal to one if the highest educational degree
is unknown
full emp dummy variable equal to one if the individual had an employ-
ment subject to social social security contributions in the year
before retirement
partial ret dummy variable equal to one if the individual was partly
retired in the year before retirement
comp ins dummy variable equal to one if the individual was compulsorily
insured due to unemployment, sickness or rehabilitation33 in
the year before retirement
marg emp dummy variable equal to one if the individual was marginally
employed in the year before retirement
vol ins dummy equal to one if a person was voluntarily insured in the
year before retirement
pas ins dummy equal to one if a person was passively insured in the
year before retirement
others dummy equal to one for all other individuals that are neither
passive, vol ins, marg emp, comp ins, part ret or full emp,
which includes the following employment categories: credited
insurance, other compulsory insurances, other status
and unknown status
33Refer to SGB III and § 3 Nr. 3 SGB VI.
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6.2 Appendix B - The Option Value Model and SUF Ver-
sichertenrentenzugang 2003
The individual retirement decision is a sequential inter-temporal discrete choice
problem under uncertainty that depends on socioeconomic as well as present and
future institutional and legal determinants. This inter-temporal nature of the
decision process is reflected in option value models such as by Stock and Wise
(1990).34 The option value model assumes that individuals compare the present
value of all future discounted retirement income when retiring now to all present
values of retiring in all possible future points in time. An individual chooses to
retire now if the utility from retiring today is higher than utility from retiring at
any later point in time.
Due to its structural nature the estimation of an option value model allows
policy analyses. More specifically, one can simulate the impacts of pension re-
forms on individuals retirement entry decisions and, therefore, on the distribution
of retirement age in the population. This section discusses, why the option value
model can not be applied to the data of the SUF Versichertenrentenzugang 2003.
In order to employ an option value model based on Stock and Wise (1990)
as estimated e.g. by Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004), panel data on individuals
retiring during the sample period is required. Ideally, the data should be a rep-
resentative draw from the German population of the elderly. Most importantly,
variation in the option value is needed that arises from different characteristics
across individuals retiring at different ages and still working, and from differ-
ences in pension legislation across years and cohorts. The time series information
on each individual has to be sufficiently long in order to observe changes in the
option value before retiring.
The data structure of the SUF Versichertenrentenzugang 2003 does not suf-
ficiently match these requirements. First, the data is cross-sectional as it refers
to retirement entries in 2003 only. The mechanism of the option value model
can not be revealed in such data as the decision of each single individual has to
be followed over time. A very short but insufficient time series can be extracted
from the data, though, as one has information on individuals’ labor-market and
insurance status in 2000 to 2002.
34The model by Stock and Wise (1990) does not provide for a complete solution of the complex
inter-temporal optimization problem, but includes all relevant economic incentives. Models
solving the full inter-temporal optimization problem can be found e.g. in Rust (1996), Rust
and Phelan (1997). Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992) discuss and compare three alternative
approaches of estimating an option value model. More general surveys about option value
models can be found in Arnds and Bonin (2002) and Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999).
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Second and most importantly, all individuals retire in 2003. The importance
of this point becomes clear if one describes the final measure of interest, the
probability of retiring at age a conditional on the option value at age b in the
present sample, Pr(RA = a|OVb), more formally by applying Bayes’ Rule:
Pr(RA = a|OVb) = Pr(RA = a)Pr(OVb|RA = a)
Pr(OVb)
,
where Pr(RA = a) is the unconditional probability of retiring at age a,
Pr(OVb) is the unconditional probability of an option value OV at age b, and
Pr(OVb|RA = a) is the probability of observing an option value OV at age b if
an individual retires with age a. In the present sample a refers to retirement age
in 2003 and b takes the values b = a, b = a − 1, b = a − 2 or b = a − 3. The
unconditional probability of retirement age a, Pr(RA = a), and the probability
of an option value OVb conditioned on retirement entry age a, Pr(OVb|RA = a),
can be obtained from the data sample at hand. If necessary both terms can
be weighted by age such that the representative age structure in the population
is matched. However, information on Pr(OVb) is only available for individuals
retiring in 2003 and not for a representative draw from the whole population
including also individuals retiring later. If Pr(OVb) is significantly different for
individuals inside and outside the sample, the sample has too little variation
and estimation results will be biased.35 Additional variation would come from a
longer time-series dimension including people that are still working and covering
a longer period of institutional changes. Potentially German data of retirement
entries between 1997 and 2015 are very useful as during this period adjustment
costs of early retirement are phased in and retirement age limits are gradually in-
creased. As no true time-series information is contained in the data at hand, such
variation is not sufficiently provided. Crucial information for the model is not ex-
istent and econometric models with weighting procedures, such as the “weighted”
exogenous sampling Maximum-Likelihood estimator (WESLM)36, can not help.
As the option value is a complex construction, it can not be easily obtained from
other data sources.
35Estimations indeed reveal that there is not sufficient variation concerning the option value
in the data. In the model individuals have an incentive to retire if the option value of post-
poning the retirement entry decision becomes negative. The option value falls the closer an
individual gets to its optimal moment of retirement. Therefore, individuals tend to have small
option values around the moment of retirement. In order to obtain variation, observations on
individuals still being further away from their entries into retirement are essential.
36Refer to Manski and McFadden (1981).
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Third, the sample is only representative with respect to the population of
all retirement entries in 2003 whereas it is not representative for the German
population of retired and non-retired individuals. There is a large portion of 60,
63 and 65 years old individuals retiring, as these are popular retirement ages, but
there are only few people with age 59, 61 and 64. After constructing an artificial
panel from 2000 to 2003 with all individuals retiring in 2003 the sample is not
at all representative to the German population. One can solve this problem by
weighting observations by age classes. However, weights take very extreme values.
Overall, no robust estimation method can be found to solve the most severe
problem of missing information on individuals not retiring during the sample
period. Additional data on older individuals not yet retired is needed. Ideally, a
random draw of insured persons of age 54 to 72 is needed that covers a period
of about 15 years and that includes persons that retire within the sample period
and others who are still in the labor force or not yet retired.
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